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Troubled Debt
Restructuring
Accounting Rules Fueling the
International Banking Crisis

By Sharon M. McKinnon and James F. Volkert

Some corporate debtors have prob
lems satisfying their financial obliga
tions during periods of depressed
economic conditions or other financial
hardship. Consequently, debt obliga
tions are often restructured to permit
the debtor either to defer or to reduce
the interest or the principal obligation.
There is considerable variety in the
form these restructurings may take.
Not surprisingly, in the absence of
guidelines before 1977, there was also
considerable variety in the ways that
both debtors and creditors accounted
for these events.
Statement of Financial Accounting
Standards No. 15, effective for restruc
turings occurring after December 31,
1977, prescribes accounting treatment
for both extinguishments and revised
loan covenants of debts defined as
“troubled.” While the statement could
be said to have resolved the con
sistency and comparability problems
associated with troubled debt, its issu
ance did little to advance the FASB’s
claims as an impartial standard-setting
body devoted to theoretical con
sistency.
Several issues merit a re
examination, over six years later, of the
circumstances surrounding issuance
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of SFAS No. 15. First, economic events
of the mid-1970’s played a significant
role in the promulgation of standards
on troubled debt restructurings. These
economic factors have loomed even
larger in the early 1980’s and provide
a startling example of how accounting
and reporting requirements can signifi
cantly interact with macroeconomic
events. Second, the ability of one
industry group to impose its viewpoint
on the standard-setting process war
rants analysis in retrospect of the con
sequences of the FASB’s acquies
cence. Third, in light of subsequent
issuances in the FASB’s conceptual

International debt crises are
putting pressure on the World
Bank to take action.

framework project, the choices made
in SFAS No. 15 appear all the more
indefensible.

Historical Setting for SFAS
No. 15
Several factors contributed to an
increase in loan restructurings in the
mid-1970’s. The real estate market
experienced a dramatic recession,
much to the dismay of the commercial
banks investing heavily in Real Estate
Investment Trusts (REITs). Debt re
structurings occurred as a result of
tightening financial conditions. Com
pounding these problems was the fis
cal distress of large entities such as
Penn Central, W. T. Grant, and the city
of New York.
In addition, banks had increased
their foreign loans substantially. Large
deposits of dollars by oil-producing
countries allowed banks to loan dollars
to developing countries. They in turn
used the dollars to purchase oil, and
dollars were again deposited by the oil
producers. This cycle dramatically
increased the availability of dollardenominated loans. In hindsight, the
problems caused by liberal loans to
developing countries appear easy to
predict, but for several years the sig
nificant growth of many less developed
countries postponed what now seems
so inevitable.

Accounting Choices
Various events can occur when a
debtor is faced with difficulties in ful
filling a debt obligation. One course of
action is to settle the debt on some
terms agreeable to both parties,
usually resulting in an economic loss
to the creditor. The creditor may
believe that some lesser repayment is
better than to chance losing the entire
amount owed. Accounting and report
ing of this type of definite transaction
is relatively straightforward because
the traditional accounting model
“sees” the settlement as an income or
expense recognition event within the
standard accounting framework.
What is more difficult to address is
a continuation of the debt with a modifi
cation in terms, generally consisting of
a lower interest rate, lower principal
amount, or extended time to repay.
The nature of these concessions is that
the debtor will economically benefit
and the creditor will lose. Whether or
not the concession itself is an event
worthy of triggering immediate recog-

nition of this loss was the controversial
issue confronting the FASB in 1977.
Exhibit 1 provides a simple numeri
cal example of how changes in terms
can affect the present value of a loan.
The original loan of $10,000 is
recorded by both parties at its face
value (ignoring complications such as
discounted notes). In addition to being
face value, this is also the present
value of the loan, as demonstrated in
the exhibit. Each of the three modifi
cations in terms reduces the present
value of the loan, yet in each the abso
lute amount of cash to be received
over the life of the debt exceeds the
original amount of $10,000.

Prevalent practice before 1977 for
restructurings was not to change the
carrying amount of the loan receivable
to reflect a new present value unless
the change was a reduction of prin
cipal. Instead of immediate recognition
that a loss had occurred, future interest
income was reduced. Most financial
institutions, in many cases adhering to
state or federal banking laws, take
other steps to deal with problem loans.
Accrual of overdue interest income
ceases after a certain time. For exam
ple, New York banking laws prohibit
recognition of interest income that is
thirty days past the billing due date.
U.S. regulations allow ninety days.
Levels of allowances for loan losses
are tied to estimates of potential loan
portfolio risk and closely correlated to
the amount of “non-performing” loans.
But banks have been particularly
reluctant to recognize immediately the
economic losses associated with res
tructuring. When the FASB issued a
Discussion Memorandum in 1976
which addressed various suggested
proposals for dealing with restructur
ings, the response from the banking
industry was overwhelmingly negative.
The Board received close to 900 let
ters of comment, most from bankers.
According to Marshall Armstrong, then
chairman of the FASB, most of the
responses failed to discuss the issues,
being “unreasoned protests against
current value accounting.”
Of the five alternatives in the Discus
sion Memorandum, four involved some
approach to recognizing the current
value of the loan receivable by using
present value techniques. By focusing
on the controversial terminology “cur
rent value,” the banking industry tried
to shift its arguments to a theoretical
level. Most of the controversy sur

rounding “current value” accounting
concerns difficulties in determining the
worth of tangible assets. Debt obliga
tions with fixed terms actually provide
ideal examples of assets whose true
value is quite easily determinable.

The arguments to postpone use of
present value until formulation of a
conceptual framework were merely
window dressing for more pragmatic
objections. All the current value
methods would result in larger addi
tions to loan loss reserves than the
historical methods in use at that time.
Federal Reserve regulations are quite
strict regarding the size of these
reserves. When a loan becomes a bad
debt, the bank must adjust its loan loss
reserves. These reserves act as offsets

to banks’ primary capital, of which
American banks are required to main
tain $1 for every $20 in outstanding
loans. Because banks generally stay
as close to that ratio as possible, writ
ing off losses due to restructuring
could reduce lending by some 20 times
the capital loss. This threat of
decreased income could discourage
banks from renegotiating loans and
have negative effects on firms in finan
cial distress.

The FASB Reaction
The banking industry was granted a
reprieve by the provisions of Statement
No. 15, issued in June 1977. The
FASB reacted to the negative
response to its Discussion Memoran
dum by prescribing standards which

EXHIBIT 1
Terms of Original Loan: Principal-$10,000; Interest-12%; Term-5 years
Present Value: Principal-$10,000 x .56743
lnterest-$1,200 x 3.60478

= $ 5,674
4,326
$10,000

Recorded amount of loan

Modifications:
1. Change interest rate to 8 percent:

Present Value: Principal-$10,000 x .56743
lnterest-$800 x 3.60478

= $ 5,674
2,884
$ 8,558
= $10,000
4,000

Absolute amount of cash: Principal
Interest

$14,000

2. Change principal to $8,000:
Present Value: Principal-$8,000 x .56743
lnterest-$960 x 3.60478

=

$ 4,539
3,461

$ 8,000
Absolute amount of cash: Principal
Interest

=

$ 8,000
4,800
$12,800

3. Change life to 8 years with the same absolute amount of
interest as for previous 5 years life:
Present Value: Principal-$10,000 x .40388
lnterest-$750 x 4.96764

=

$ 4,039
3,726

$ 7,765
Absolute amount of cash: Principal
Interest

= $10,000
6,000

$16,000
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in conjunction with these conceptual
pronouncements indicates that the
debt restructuring statement exhibits
serious deficiencies.

A look should be taken at
how theory and reality relate
to the standard-setting
process.

basically continued existing practice.
Instead of recognition of losses in the
value of receivables, increased dis
closure was deemed sufficient.
Statement No. 15 applied only to
troubled debt restructurings defined as
occurring when
. .the creditor for
economic or legal reasons related to
the debtor’s financial difficulties grants
a concession to the debtor it would not
otherwise consider.” In the case where
the debt is settled, gains and losses
are recognized by each party based on
the fair value of assets exchanged in
relation to the recorded value of the
debt.
When debt is continued with a
modification in terms, treatment
depends upon the amount of the total
future cash flows. If this total is less
than the carrying amount of the debt
(a rare situation), gains and losses are
recognized. If, however, the new terms
result in total future cash flows greater
than the carrying amount of the debt,
no gain or loss is recognized by either
party. Instead, a new effective interest
rate is used to recognize a smaller
amount of interest revenue or expense
over the remaining life of the debt. No
distinction was made as to the type of
change. Accounting for reductions in
face amount was made consistent with
other modifications.

Theoretical Inconsistencies
As highlighted previously, much of
the dissent of the banking industry
focused on their displeasure with cur
rent value accounting. Letters cited a
desire to let the FASB complete its
conceptual framework project instead
of taking a “piecemeal” approach with
regard to one industry. The interven
ing seven years have produced
several Statements of Financial
Accounting Concepts in the framework
project. Analysis of Statement No. 15
16/The Woman CPA, April, 1986

The FASB has continually empha
sized that conceptual framework
pronouncements are suggestive rather
than definitive. It has also disclaimed
attempts to apply concepts retroac
tively to prior statements. But given the
obvious concurrent work on concepts
and actual statements, it does not
seem to be asking too much to expect
some consistency in standards. State
ment No. 15 presents an unfortunate
example where the FASB appears to
have thrown out the theory when the
political pressures intervened.
This is not to say that industry pres
sure always produces unwanted con
sequences. Economic aftereffects of
standards are at least as important as
internal theoretical consistency, and
industry is frequently most cognizant
of what standards will do to their oper
ations and the economy in which they
interact. But it does warrant a look at
how theory and reality relate to the
standard-setting process.

Objectives of Financial Reporting.
As part of the conceptual framework,
the FASB defines the purposes of
financial reporting. The three primary
objectives are to provide (1) informa
tion useful in investment and credit
decisions, (2) information useful in
assessing cash flow prospects, and (3)
information
about
enterprise
resources, claims to those resources
and changes in them. For industries
whose resources consist materially of
monetary assets and liabilities, the
course prescribed by Statement No. 15
appears to run counter to each of
these objectives.

Consider the example in Exhibit 1.
A firm holding the $10,000 receivable
would suffer an economic loss under
any of the three modifications. Under
Statement No. 15, there would be no
loss on the income statement and no
indication on the balance sheet that
assets were less valuable than before
the restructuring. The negative effects
on future cash flows are obscured; the
changes in the value of the enterprises
resources are ignored; and potential
debt or equity investors are forced to
rely on additional disclosures to ana
lyze what is really happening in the
firm.

And what of the additional dis
closures? The Statement prescribes
that creditors disclose the income that
would have been recorded in the
period ignoring restructure in compar
ison to that which was recorded. Com
mitments to lend additional funds are
also disclosed. It does not require dis
closure of information that would en
able investors to assess future cash
flows. In addition, the FASB specifi
cally allows firms to choose their own
forms of disclosure. The disclosure
requirements can be met by discus
sion of reduced earnings potential
of entire portfolios of receivables,
grouped into major categories, without
separate mention of troubled restruc
tured receivables. Thus it is generally
impossible for the user of financial
statements to determine the effects of
debt restructurings on the firm.
What is a transaction? The tradi
tional accounting model records
assets at their historical cost. Because
this cost is not changed to reflect
changes in value, the model has been
subject to criticism that cost loses rel
evance as it diverges from value, and
that value should replace cost in a new
accounting model. Bankers objected
to being among the first to be subject
to new current value techniques.

Transactions are not
prerequisites for accrual
based accounting systems,
but existence of economic
substance and change are.

But parties on both sides of the cur
rent value/historical cost debate agree
that the two are identical at the
moment of the arms’ length transac
tion between parties. The primary flaw
in the outcry against using present
value to measure the value of the re
structured receivable is the misunder
standing of this fact. Present value is
merely the technique that is used to
measure value, and at the point of the

transaction it is the technique used to
measure cost as well. The $10,000
recorded value of the original transac
tion is historical cost. It is a combina
tion of the present value of the
principal to be received in five years
and the present value of the stream of
interest cash flows over five years.

The key to what the receivable
should reflect concerns not whether or
not present value techniques should
be used but whether or not a transac
tion has occurred which triggers deter
mination of a new “cost” to the firm.
The FASB rationale was that a trans
action of substance has not occurred.
Without a transaction, no new carrying
value (and consequently no recog
nized loss) is required.
Not only is this argument itself with
out merit, but it is also one which
appears to be trotted out when ration
ale is needed for selected pronounce
ments and completely ignored for
others. Transactions are not prerequi
sites for accrual-based accounting sys
tems, but existence of economic
substance and change are. Wearing
out of fixed assets is of sufficient eco
nomic significance to record periodic
depreciation. Gains and losses on for
eign currency commitments are
accrued for reporting because
exchange rate changes indicate eco
nomic gain or loss. Leases which are
sales in disguise must be capitalized
and depreciated, regardless of the lack
of “ownership.” Even more closely
tied to the debt restructuring situation
are accruals of losses for warranties
and contingent liabilities. In each case
the present period is assessed for
losses expected to physically occur in
the future. This accounting is justified
on the basis that the future losses will
result from events that have already
occurred, and in spite of the necessity
to estimate.
Troubled debt restructurings are no
different in concept. Future losses will
occur because of new loan terms,
transacted in the present and precisely
measurable. The old recorded value
incorporated expectations of future
income. A transaction has occurred
and new expectations of reduced
future income should define a new
historical cost.

Public Pressure
Restructuring of debt joined that
group of controversial issues where

special interest groups influence deci
sions to ignore economic substance
with the argument of “no transaction.”
Most prominent among these is non
accounting for pension liabilities. Pub
lic outcry against FASB proposals to
recognize unfunded pensions as liabil
ities may very well result in theory
again taking a back seat.
The FASB is in an unenviable posi
tion, fighting for its existence between
two formidable parties. On one hand,
business demands favorable account
ing standards; on the other the SEC
expects standards to keep business in
line. Funding comes from the business
community; the right to exist from the

Business demands favorable
accounting standards; the
SEC expects standards to
keep business in line.

SEC. It is little wonder that pronounce
ments frequently reflect desperate
attempts to keep each at bay. Unfor
tunately, evidence increasingly sug
gests that the FASB will not stand up
to strong business lobbying. Com
plaints of income fluctuations by mul
tinational businesses led to rescission
of Statement No. 8 on foreign currency
translation. Accounting for changing
prices was only addressed after the
SEC stepped in with its own require
ments. And the FASB was never able
to get past business’ objections to its
proposals for dealing with the con
troversial sales/leasebacks of invest
ment tax credit assets allowed by the
first Reagan tax bill. On that subject no
definitive pronouncement was ever
issued.

Economic Reality
Theoretical inconsistency and bow
ing to industry pressure have both
been defended by arguments invoking
potential effects of accounting rules on
“the greater good.” Statement No. 8

The accounting rules which
allowed banks to postpone
recognizing economic losses
have had more negative than
positive economic
consequences.

was said to inspire inefficient foreign
currency management practices and
was even accused of contributing to
the decline of the dollar. The same
type of arguments were advanced by
the banking lobbying efforts for State
ment No. 15. Bankers claimed that
recognizing losses would stifle the
economy by inhibiting loans to needy
parties and by drying up capital
reserves. It is true that, in the face of
severe macroeconomic effects, an
insistence on theoretical consistency
appears trivial. To analyze this argu
ment, it is necessary to consider what
economic effects Statement No. 15 has
contributed to in its brief history.
The major effect of the statement is
that it allows creditors to avoid reduc
ing their income, with the concurrent
effects on capital, as long as new
terms guarantee that future cash flows
equal or exceed the debt’s carrying
amount. If the debt were instead set
tled for whatever the creditor could get,
a loss would ensue. This is the real
inefficiency of the statement: creditors
are lured into the more pleasing route
of income statement restructuring,
despite the real possibility that they
would be economically better off to set
tle immediately.
One has to look at the events in the
international lending community to
understand the negative economic
reality that has been fueled by an
accounting anomaly. Since 1973, debt
of the 16 largest third world debtors
has increased by over $480 billion
reaching $520 billion by early 1985.
As the dollar strengthened with high
interest rates, many of these countries
began experiencing disruptions of debt
servicing in the early 1980’s. About
two-thirds of this debt is in trouble. In
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1981, $2.6 billion debt was resche
duled; in 1985 it may reach or exceed
$100 billion.
As long as the debtors can continue
borrowing enough to pay interest on
old loans, the merry-go-round con
tinues. When debtors begin faltering,
the recycling slows. Some worried cre
ditors, usually the least exposed, stop
throwing good money after bad.
Others are too involved to cut their
losses. If you owe the bank $1000 and
cannot pay, it is your problem. If you
owe the banks $300 billion and cannot
pay, the banks are in trouble. Consider
Citibank, for example. As the largest
U.S. bank, it has capital of $5.5 billion.
Citibank’s Brazilian loans alone
amount to $4.4 billion. Manufacturers
Hanover has $3.7 billion, 112 percent
of its net worth, tied up in loans to Bra
zil and Argentina. Chase Manhattan
also has $3.6 billion, or 92 percent of
its net worth, in loans to the same two
countries. The nine largest U.S. banks
together have $28 billion in capital, but
$64 billion in loans outstanding to trou
bled economies.1 One year of no
interest or principal payments from
Latin America would eliminate all
profits and most capital of these U.S.
banks. If Brazil, Argentina, and Mex
ico decided to join forces and repudi
ate their debts, the nine largest U.S.
banks would be wiped out.

Of course this will not happen.
Governments, both of debt troubled
countries and strong banking coun
tries, cannot allow the massive col
lapse of the international monetary
system this situation portends. Efforts
are being made by the International
Monetary Fund, groups of debtor
countries, and others to forestall each
confrontation between bank and
debtor country. The banks may come
out in the end solely because they are
too vital to let go under.
Whatever the ultimate resolution of
the crisis, it is obvious that the
accounting rules which allowed banks
to postpone recognizing economic
losses have had more negative than
positive economic consequences.
What would have happened given the
necessity to write down restructured
loans is impossible to reconstruct. But
in retrospect it is easy to believe that
the loan merry-go-round would have
slowed more gradually, with time for
the world economy to readjust, than
face the present fear of total collapse.

measure and report behavior, not
become the object of behavior. The
accounting principle should not
influence the economic decision, but
merely report it. The troubled debt
pronouncement is an unfortunate
example where all the negative factors
came into place at one time. The pri
mary arguments against recognizing
losses on restructuring were theoreti
cal consistency and the potential
effects on the economy. The resulting
statement is a model for inconsistency,
and has probably exacerbated the
largest financial crisis in history. The
FASB’s pronouncement provides
heavy fuel for those parties who
scorn the ability of business and
the accounting profession to regulate
themselves.Ω

NOTE
1Von Hoffman, Nicholas, The New Republic,
October 14, 1985, pp. 21-22.

Conclusion
Standard setting for financial report
ing is a complex process affected con
currently by the need to serve
numerous masters, maintain theoreti
cal consistency, and accommodate the
realities of the world economic struc
ture. Ideally, financial reporting should

Home Office Deduction
from page 13

by looking to the nature of the business
activities, the attributes of the space in
which the business activities can be
carried out and the necessity of using
a home office to carry out such
activities.
While the Weissman decision is rela
tively narrow in scope, many university
professors may be able to apply their
factual situations thereto in substan
tiating a home office deduction.fi
NOTES
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